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18 On Constructivity and the Rosser Property:
a closer look at some Gödelean proofs
SAEED SALEHI & PAYAM SERAJI
Abstract
The proofs of Kleene, Chaitin and Boolos for Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
are studied from the perspectives of constructivity and the Rosser property. A proof of
the incompleteness theorem has the Rosser property when the independence of the true
but unprovable sentence can be shown by assuming only the (simple) consistency of the
theory. It is known that Gödel’s own proof for his incompleteness theorem does not have
the Rosser property, and we show that neither do Kleene’s or Boolos’ proofs. However,
we show that a variant of Chaitin’s proof can have the Rosser property. The proofs of
Gödel, Rosser and Kleene are constructive in the sense that they explicitly construct, by
algorithmic ways, the independent sentence(s) from the theory. We show that the proofs
of Chaitin and Boolos are not constructive, and they prove only the mere existence of the
independent sentences.
1 Introduction
A constructive proof provides an algorithm for constructing the claimed object; a non-
constructive proof does not show the existence of that object algorithmically, even if
sometimes an effective procedure might be hidden inside the details. A proof then is
proved to be (essentially) non-constructive when one can show that there is no algo-
rithm (computable function) which, given the assumptions (coded as input), produces
the claimed object whose existence is demonstrated in the proof. Below, we will see
one example of a (seemingly) non-constructive proof (namely, the proof of Kleene [12]
for Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, stated below) which can be made constructive
by unpacking some details; we will also see a couple of proofs (namely, the proofs of
Boolos [2] and Chaitin [4] for Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem) that are shown to
be non-constructive, by proving the non-existence of any algorithm for computing the
claimed object (namely, the true but unprovable sentence).
The (First) Incompleteness Theorem (of Gödel [6]) states that for a sufficiently strong RE
theory T there exists a sentence ψT in the language of T such that
1
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1. the sentence ψT is true (in the standard model of natural numbers);
2. if T is consistent then T 0 ψT ;
3. if T is ω-consistent then T 0 ¬ψT .
By a proof of the incompleteness theorem we mean a demonstration of the existence of
such a sentence (ψT ) for any given consistent and RE theory T that is sufficiently strong
(to be made precise later). Such a proof witnesses the Rosser property ([17]) when the
condition of ω-consistency can be replaced with (simple) consistency; that is to say that
the condition 3 above can be replaced with the following condition
3′. if T is consistent then T 0 ¬ψT .
Gödel’s original proof [6] for his incompleteness theorem is constructive, i.e., given a
(finite) description of a consistent RE theory (e.g. an input-free program which outputs
the set of all the axioms of the theory) the proof exhibits, in an algorithmic way, a sen-
tence which is true (in the standard model of natural numbers N) but unprovable in the
theory. For the independence of this sentence from the theory (i.e., the unprovability of
its negation in the theory) Gödel also assumes the theory to be ω-consistent; so if the
theory is ω-consistent, then that (true) sentence is independent from the theory (see e.g.
[21, 22]). It turned out later that the simple consistency of the theory does not suffice
for the independence of the Gödel sentence (from the theory) and the optimal condition
(which is much weaker than ω-consistency) is the consistency of the theory with its own
consistency statement ([8, Theorems 35,36]). Rosser’s proof [17] for Gödel’s first incom-
pleteness theorem assumes only the simple consistency of the (RE) theory and constructs
(algorithmically) an independent (and true) sentence. So, one can say that Gödel’s proof
does not have the Rosser property. Here, we will see that while a variant of the proof
of Chaitin has the Rosser property (i.e., the independence of Chaitin’s sentence from the
theory can be proved by assuming only the simple consistency of the theory), the proof of
Boolos does not have the Rosser property (and the optimal condition for the independence
of a Boolos sentence is the consistency of the theory with its own consistency statement).
2 Kleene’s Proof for Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem
A very cute proof for Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is that of Kleene (see e.g. [12, 21])
which deserves more recognition.
Notation 2.1 (Computability) Letϕ0,ϕ1,ϕ2, · · · be a list of all unary computable (par-
tial recursive) functions (in a way that ϕi(j), if it exists, can be computed from i and j).
A recursively enumerable set (RE for short) is the domain of ϕi, for some i ∈ N, which
is denoted byWi. The notation ϕi(j)↑ means that the function ϕi is not defined at j, or
j 6∈ Wi; and ϕi(j)↓ means that ϕi is defined at j or j ∈ Wi. Needless to say, ϕi(j) = k
means that ϕi is defined at j and is equal to k. ✧
Robinson’s Arithmetic is denoted by Q (see [24] or [21]). In all the results of this paper,
the theory Q can be replaced with a (much) weaker theory called R (see [24]). The theory
Q is finitely axiomatizable, while R is not.
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Theorem 2.2 (Kleene’s Theorem) For a given consistent and RE theory T that contains
Q there exists some t ∈ N such that ϕt(t)↑ but T 0 “ϕt(t)↑”.
Proof. (Non-Constructive Proof): Let KT = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑”}; then we have
KT ⊆ K = {n ∈ N | ϕn(n)↑} since if T ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑ ” but ϕn(n)↓ then the true
Σ1-sentence “ϕn(n)↓” is provable in (the Σ1-complete theory) Q (⊆ T ) contradicting
the consistency of T . Now, since T is RE then so is KT , whileK is not an RE set because
for any n we have n ∈ K ⇐⇒ n 6∈ Wn and so n ∈ K△Wn, thus K 6= Wn for all n.
So, KT $ K; therefore, there must exist some t ∈ K − KT . For this t we have ϕt(t)↑
but T 0 “ϕt(t)↑”. ❑
Of course if T is sound (i.e., N |= T ) or even Σ1-sound (i.e., if σ ∈ Σ1 and T ⊢ σ
then N |= σ, cf. [8]) then also T 0 “ϕt(t)↓”, i.e., the sentence “ϕt(t)↑” is (true and)
independent from T . Let us note that the above proof did not explicitly specify t ∈ N.
Proof. (Constructive Proof): SinceKT = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑”} is RE thenKT =Wt
for some t ∈ N which can be algorithmically computed from a description of the RE
theory T . Now we show the truth of “ϕ
t
(t)↑” as follows:
ϕ
t
(t)↓ =⇒ T ⊢ “ϕ
t
(t)↓” (by the Σ1-completeness of Q ⊆ T )
=⇒ T 0 “ϕ
t
(t)↑” (by the consistency of T )
=⇒ t 6∈ KT (by the definition of KT )
=⇒ t 6∈ Wt (by KT =Wt)
=⇒ ϕ
t
(t)↑ (by the definition ofWt)
Thus, t 6∈ Wt and so t 6∈ KT whence T 0 “ϕt(t)↑”. ❑
Indeed, for any RE and consistent theory T (⊇ Q) and any t with Wt = KT we have
(by the above proof) that ϕt(t) ↑ and T 0 “ϕt(t) ↑ ”. Below we show that Kleene’s
(constructive) proof does not have the Rosser property.
Theorem 2.3 (Kleene’s Proof is not Rosserian) For any given consistent and RE theory
T ⊇ Q there exists an RE and consistent theory U ⊇ T such that U ⊢ “ϕu(u)↓” for some
u ∈ N which satisfiesWu = {n ∈ N | U ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑”} (andϕu(u)↑).
Proof. There exists a computable (and total) function ~ such that for any sentence ψ we
haveW~(ψ) = {n ∈ N | T + ψ ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑”}. By the Diagonal Lemma there exists a
sentence λ such that Q ⊢ λ ↔ “ϕ
~(λ)
(
~(λ)
)
↓”. Clearly, for the theory U = T + λ and
u = ~(λ) we have U ⊢ “ϕu(u)↓” andWu = {n ∈ N | U ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑ ”}. It remains
to show that U is consistent: Otherwise, T ⊢ ¬λ and so T ⊢ “ϕu(u)↑ ” which implies
that T + λ ⊢ “ϕu(u)↑ ” whence u ∈ W~(λ) = Wu. On the other hand T ⊢ “ϕu(u)↑ ”
implies thatϕu(u)↑ holds (since otherwiseϕu(u)↓ by theΣ1−completeness would imply
T ⊢ “ϕu(u)↓” contradicting the consistency of T ) and so u 6∈ Wu; a contradiction. ❑
Summing up, for any consistent and RE extension T of Q we have T 0 “ϕt(t)↑” and
ϕt(t)↑ for any t which satisfies Wt = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑”}. Moreover, if T is
Σ1-sound thenϕt(t)↑ is independent from T (i.e., we also have T 0 “ϕt(t)↓”). However,
if the theory T is notΣ1-sound then for some e withWe = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑”} the
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sentence ϕe(e)↑ might not be independent from T (and its negation could be provable in
T , that is T ⊢ “ϕe(e)↓”).
Albert Visser has informed the authors that for any RE and consistent theory T which is
sufficiently strong (see e.g. the explanations before Theorem 4.6 below) there exists some
ϑ withWϑ = {n ∈ N | T ⊢ “ϕn(n)↑ ”} such that (beside ϕϑ(ϑ)↑ and T 0 “ϕϑ(ϑ)↑”
we also have) T 0 “ϕϑ(ϑ)↓”, or in the other words the sentence ϕϑ(ϑ)↑ is independent
from T ; moreover ϑ can be algorithmically computed from a given description of the RE
theory T . The proof of this Rosserian version of Kleene’s proof is rather involved and will
appear in a future paper. Let us note that a Rosserian version of this beautiful theorem
of Kleene appeared in [13] (see also [14]) where Kleene calls it “a symmetric form” of
Gödel’s (incompleteness) theorem (also see [19] for a modern treatment).
3 Chaitin’s Proof for Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem
There are various versions of Chaitin’s proof for the incompleteness theorem [4], which
is sometimes called “Chaitin’s incompleteness theorem”; this proof appears in e.g. [1, 5,
16, 23]. We consider the version presented in [1].
Definition 3.1 (Kolmogorov-Chaitin Complexity) For any natural number m let
K (m) = min{i ∈ N | ϕi(0)↓= m}. ✧
The function K is total and for any e ∈ N there are finitely many m’s which satisfy
K (m) 6 e. The following is Lemma 7 of [1].
Lemma 3.2 (Uncomputability of Complexity) There is no computable function f
which satisfies K
(
f(m)
)
> m for allm ∈ N.
Proof. If there were such a computable function f , then by Kleene’s second recursion
theorem there would exist some e such that ϕe(x) = f(e) and so, ϕe(0) = f(e) which
implies K
(
f(e)
)
6 e; a contradiction. ❑
So, K is not computable, since otherwise f(x) = min{y | K (y) > x}, which satisfies
∀x : K
(
f(x)
)
> x, would be computable.
Theorem 3.3 (Chaitin’s Theorem) For any consistent RE theory T which contains Q
there exists a constant cT ∈ N such that for any e > cT and any w ∈ N we have
T 0 “K (w) > e”.
Proof. If not, then for any given m ∈ N there exists some e > m and some w such that
T ⊢ “K (w) > e”. Let us note that if T ⊢ “K (w) > e” for a consistent T ⊇ Q
then K (w) > e, since otherwise, if K (w) 6 e, the true Σ1-sentence “K (w) 6 e”
would be provable in Q (and so in T ) which contradicts the consistency of T . Now, for a
given m we can, by an algorithmic proof search in T , find some e > m and w such that
T ⊢ “K (w) > e” (and so K (w) > e); our assumption guarantees the termination of
this algorithm for any inputm. Let f(m) be one of those w’s; then K
(
f(m)
)
> e > m
which contradicts Lemma 3.2. ❑
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This is an incompleteness theorem since for any c there are cofinitely many w’s with
K (w) > c. So, for a given T which is consistent and RE and contains Q there are
cofinitely many w’s such that the true sentences “K (w) > cT ” are unprovable in T . As
for the constructivity of this proof, the good news is that a constant cT which satisfies
Chaitin’s Theorem (3.3) can be algorithmically constructed from T .
Theorem 3.4 (Computing a Chaitin Constant) For a given consistent and RE extension
T of Q one can algorithmically construct a constant cT such that for all e > cT and all
w, we have T 0 “K (w) > e”.
Proof. Given a description of a consistent, Σ1-complete and RE theory T the following
can be done algorithmically. Define ~(x, y) to be the first ordered pair 〈a, b〉 such that the
proof search algorithm of T shows up (a proof of) the sentence “K (a) > b > x” (so,
T ⊢ “K (a) > b > x”). This is (a partially) computable (function) and an index of it
can be calculated from (a description of) T . By Kleene’s second recursion theorem there
exists a constant c such that ϕc(y) = ~1(c, y), where ~1(x, y) is the first component of
the ordered pair ~(x, y). The constant c can be computed from T ; let us denote it by cT .
Now, we show that for no b > cT and no a can T ⊢ “K (a) > b” hold. If there exists
such a and b then we have T ⊢ “K (a) > b > cT ”. If 〈a, b〉 is the first ordered pair such
that “K (a) > b > cT ” appears in the above mentioned proof search algorithm of T ,
then ~(cT , 0) = 〈a, b〉 and so ϕcT (0) = ~1(cT , 0) = a. Thus, K (a) 6 cT , and by the
Σ1-completeness of T we have T ⊢ “K (a) 6 cT ”. But from T ⊢ “K (a) > b > cT ”
we have T ⊢ “K (a) > cT ”, contradicting the consistency of T . ❑
Unfortunately, by Lemma 3.2 one cannot calculate a w with K (w) > cT given cT for
a theory T . Otherwise one could get a constructive version of Chaitin’s proof: Given a
consistent and RE theory T ⊇ Q one calculates cT and finds some w with K (w) > cT ;
then “K (w) > cT ” is a true sentence which is not provable in T . It is actually known
that Chaitin’s proof is not constructive; see e.g. [16, page 1394] or [23, page 95].
Theorem 3.5 (Non-Constructivity of Chaitin’s Proof) There is no algorithm such that
for a given consistent and RE extension T of Q can compute some wT such that both
T 0 “K (wT ) > cT ” and K (wT ) > cT holds, where cT is a Chaitin constant as in
Theorem 3.4.
Proof. If such a wT were computable from T , then the theory T∞ =
⋃
i∈N Ti would be
RE where T0 = Q and inductively Ti+1 = Ti+“K (wTi ) > cTi” are defined by iterating
the computation procedure. The theory T∞ is also consistent (indeed, sound) and contains
Q, so by Chaitin’s Theorem (3.3) there should exist some constant cT∞ such that for no
w can we have the deduction T∞ ⊢ “K (w) > cT∞”. But this is a contradiction because
we have cTi < cTi+1 and also cTi < cT∞ for all i ∈ N. ❑
Proof. (An Alternative Proof) Albert Visser suggested the following argument as another
proof of Theorem 3.5: Since the sequence {cTi}i∈N is strictly increasing, we have that
cTm > m for any m ∈ N. Now, ∀m ∈ N : K (wTm) > cTm > m would contradict
Lemma 3.2 if wT were computable from T . ❑
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Remark 3.6 Albert Visser noted that Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 amusingly imply Lemma 3.2,
since if there were a computable (total) function f with ∀m ∈ N : K
(
f(m)
)
> m then
one could take wT as f(cT ). ✧
The true unprovable sentences “K (w) > e” (for e > cT ) are also independent when T
is a (Σ1-)sound theory: If T ⊢ “K (w) 6 e” then the Σ1-sentence K (w) 6 e has to be
true, a contradiction. So, we restate Chaitin’s Theorem as
Corollary 3.7 (Chaitin’s Theorem, restated) Let T be a Σ1-sound and RE theory such
that T ⊇ Q. There exists some cT (which is computable from T ) such that for any e > cT
there are cofinitely many w’s such that “K (w) > e” is independent from T . ❑
For a Rosserian version of Chaitin’s Theorem the assumption of the “Σ1-soundness” (of
T ) in Corollary 3.7 should be replaced with (its simple) “consistency”. For doing that we
need the following version of the Pigeonhole Principle in Q (which holds in R too).
Lemma 3.8 (A Pigeonhole Principle) For any k ∈ N we have
Q ⊢ ∀z0, · · · , zk
( ∧
06i6k
zi < k −→
∨i6=j
06i,j6k
zi = zj
)
.
Proof. This can be proved by induction (in the metalanguage) on k: for k = 0 it suffices
to note that Q ⊢ ∀z¬(z < 0) and for the induction step it suffices to use the derivation
Q ⊢ ∀z(z < k + 1→ z < k ∨ z = k); cf. [21, page 73]. ❑
Theorem 3.9 (Rosserian form of Chaitin’s Theorem) For any consistent RE extension
T of Q there is a constant cT (which is computable from T ) such that for any e > cT
there are cofinitely many w’s such that “K (w) > e” is independent from T .
Proof. By Chaitin’s Theorem (3.3) there exists a constant cT (which is com-
putable from T ) such that for any e > cT there are cofinitely many w’s such
that “K (w) > e” is true but unprovable in T . Fix an e > cT . For no w can
T ⊢ “K (w) > e” hold, and T ⊢ “K (w) 6 e” can hold for at most (e + 1)-many
w’s: if for some distinct w0,w1, . . . ,we+1, the derivations T ⊢ “K (wi) 6 e” hold
(i = 0, 1, . . . , e+1) then T ⊢ ∃z0, z1, . . . , ze+1
(∧e+1
i=0 [zi 6 e ∧ ϕzi(0)↓= wi]
)
and
so T ⊢ ∃z0, z1, . . . , ze+1
(∧
06i6e+1[zi < e + 1] ∧
∧ i6=j
06i,j6e+1[zi 6= zj ]
)
which
contradicts Lemma 3.8 (for k = e + 1). Thus, for cofinitely many w’s we should have
both T 0 “K (w) > e” and T 0 “K (w) 6 e”. ❑
Martin Davis [5] calls Chaitin’s Theorem “a dramatic extension of Gödel’s incomplete-
ness theorem”. We saw that this theorem as presented in Corollary 3.7 can be hardly
considered an extension of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, as Gödel’s proof is con-
structive while Chaitin’s is not (Theorem 3.5). The Rosserian form of Chaitin’s Theorem
as presented in Theorem 3.9 could be considered as an extension of Gödel’s and Chaitin’s
theorems in a sense, even though, it is not any more extension than Rosser’s own [17]; let
us also note that Rosser’s proof is constructive (while the proof of Theorem 3.9 is not).
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4 Boolos’ Proof for Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem
Jon Barwise calls it “a very lovely proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem, probably
the deepest single result about the relationship between computers and mathematics”, and
mentions that it is “the most straightforward proof of this result that I have ever seen”1.
After its first appearance in [2] this proof was discussed, extended and studied in e.g.
[9–11, 15, 18, 20].
Notation 4.1 (Arithmetization) For an RE theory T denote the provability predicate of
T by PrT (x); so Con(T ) = ¬PrT (⊥) is the consistency statement of T . Suppose that
the variables are x, x′, x′′, x′′′, · · · whose lengths are 1, 2, 3, 4, · · · , respectively. ✧
So, for any k ∈ N there are at most finitely many formulas with length k.
Definition 4.2 (Formalizing Berry’s Paradox) For a formula ψ(x1, · · · , xm) with the
shown (possibly empty) set of free variables (m > 0) and number n, let D(ψ, n) be the
(Gödel code of the) formula ∀x[ψ(x, · · · , x) ↔ x = n]. The number n is definable in T
by the formula ψ when PrT
(
D(ψ, n)
)
holds.
Let Def <zT (y) = ∃x
[
len(x) < z ∧ PrT
(
D(x, y)
)]
, where len(x) denotes the length
of (the formula with Gödel code) x. The formula Def <zT (y) states that “there exists a
formulaψ(x1, · · · , xm)whose length is smaller than the number z such that the deduction
T ⊢ ∀x[ψ(x, · · · , x) ↔ x = y] holds”, or informally “the number y is definable in T by
a formula with length less than z”.
Let Berry <vT (u) = ¬Def
<v
T (u) ∧ ∀y < u Def
<v
T (y), meaning that “u is the least
number not definable by a formula with length less than v”.
Let ℓT be the length of the formula Berry
<x′
T (x) and let BoolosT (x) be the formula
∃x′
[
x′ = 5 · ℓT ∧ Berry
<x′
T (x)
]
. Let bT be the least number not definable by a formula
with length less than 5ℓT . ✧
Theorem 4.3 (Boolos’ Theorem) For any consistent and RE extension T of Q, the sen-
tence BoolosT (bT ) is (true but) unprovable in T .
Proof. First we show that Q ⊢ ∀u, v[Berry <vT (n) ∧ Berry
<v
T (u) → n = u] holds
for any n ∈ N. Reason inside Q: if for some u, v we have (a) Berry <vT (n) and
(b) Berry <vT (u) then (a’) ¬Def
<v
T (n), (a”) ∀y < nDef
<v
T (y), (b’) ¬Def
<v
T (u)
and (b”) ∀y < uDef <vT (y) hold. Now, by u 6 n ∨ n 6 u, if u 6= n then either
u < n or n < u holds. In the former case we have a contradiction between (a”) and
(b’), and in the latter case we have a contradiction between (a’) and (b”). Therefore,
n = u. Now, assume (for the sake of contradiction) that T ⊢ BoolosT (bT ). Then
T ⊢ ∀u, v[Berry <vT (n) ∧ Berry
<v
T (u) → n = u], shown above, implies the deduction
T ⊢ ∀x[BoolosT (x)↔ x = bT ]. Thus, bT is definable in T by the formula BoolosT (x)
whose length is less than ℓT + len(5 · ℓT ) + 9 = 4ℓT + 26 < 5ℓT (since, for any m,
the term m = s(· · · (s(0)) . . .) [m-times s] has length 3m + 1). So, the Σ1-sentence
1J. Barwise, “Editorial Notes: This Month’s Column”, Notices of the American Mathematical Society, vol 36,
no. 4 (1989), page 388.
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Def
<5·ℓT
T (bT ) is true, thus provable in Q; whence T ⊢ Def
<5·ℓT
T (bT ). On the other
hand T ⊢ BoolosT (bT ) implies that T ⊢ ¬Def
<5·ℓT
T (bT ), and this contradicts the
consistency of T . ❑
The formulaBoolosT (bT ) is notΠ1; however, the followingmodification from [9] proves
a Π1-incompleteness.
Theorem 4.4 (Boolos’ Theorem, modified) For any consistent and RE extension T of
Q, the true Π1-sentence ¬Def
<5·ℓT
T (bT ) is unprovable in T .
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that T ⊢ ¬Def <5·ℓTT (bT ). Since any y < bT is definable
by a formula with length less than 5ℓT then the Σ1-sentence ∀y < bT Def
<5·ℓT
T (y) is
true and thus provable in T . Therefore, ¬Def <5·ℓTT (bT ) ∧ ∀y < bT Def
<5·ℓT
T (y) is
provable in T and so T ⊢ BoolosT (bT ), contradicting Theorem 4.3. ❑
Even though ℓT is computable from T , below we show that one cannot calculate bT .
Theorem 4.5 (Non-Constructivity of Boolos’ Proof) There is no algorithm such that
for a given consistent and RE extension T of Q can compute bT .
Proof. Assume that bT is computable from T , and let T0 = Q and inductively Tj+1 =
Tj + ¬Def
<5·ℓTj
Tj
(bTj ). Define the function ~(n), for any n ∈ N, to be the maxi-
mum of m’s such that ∀j < m : len(“ϕj(0) ↓= x”) < n. This is a computable
and non-decreasing function; also limn ~(n) = ∞. So, from limj ℓTj = ∞ we have
limj ~(5ℓTj) = ∞. Therefore, for any (given) x one can compute some ι(x) such that
~(5ℓTι(x)) > x. The proof will be complete when show that K (bTj ) > ~(5ℓTj ) holds for
any j: Because, by the computability of bTj from j, we will have a computable function
x 7→ bTι(x) which satisfies ∀x : K
(
bTι(x)
)
> ~(5ℓTι(x)) > x contradicting Lemma 3.2.
For showing that K (bTj ) > ~(5ℓTj ) holds for any j, we show more generally that for
any u, v if ¬Def <vT (u) holds, for some consistent T ⊇ Q, then K (u) > ~(v): If, to
the contrary, we have K (u) < ~(v) then there exists some j such that (1) j < ~(v) and
(2) ϕj(0)↓= u. By (2) the number u is definable by the formula “ϕj(0)↓= x” in Q (and
so in T ), and by (1) the length of the formula “ϕj(0)↓= x” is less than v; so Def
<v
T (u)
should hold, a contradiction. ❑
Of course, when T is Σ1-sound then ¬Def
<5·ℓT
T (bT ) is independent from T .
Also BoolosT (bT ) is independent from T : Because if T ⊢ ¬BoolosT (bT ) then
T ⊢ ¬Berry <5·ℓTT (bT ) and so T ⊢ ∀y < bT Def
<5·ℓT
T (y) → Def
<5·ℓT
T (bT ). But
∀y < bT Def
<5·ℓT
T (y), being a true Σ1-sentence, is provable in T . Whence, we have
T ⊢ Def <5·ℓTT (bT ), a contradiction. However, we show in the following theorem that
if T is not Σ1-sound then Def
<5·ℓT
T (bT ), and so ¬BoolosT (bT ), could be provable in
T . For the following theorem to make sense we note that for any theory U satisfying the
following conditions
(i) U 0 Con(U), i.e., Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem holds for U ;
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(ii) U ⊢ Con(U + ψ)→ Con(U), for any ψ;
there exists a consistent theory S ⊇ U such that S+Con(S) is not consistent: The theory
S = U + ¬Con(U) is consistent by (i), and S ⊢ ¬Con(S) because S ⊢ ¬Con(U) by
the definition of S and S ⊢ ¬Con(U)→ ¬Con(S) by (ii).
One example for a theory that satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii) above, and also (iii) in
Theorem 4.6 and (iv) in Theorem 4.7 below, is Peano’s Arithmetic. This arithmetic is in-
deed too strong and the finitely axiomatizable theory IΣ1 (see [7]) satisfies the conditions
(i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). Even the weaker theories I∆0 + Ω1 (see [25]) and S
1
2 (see [3]) are
strong enough to satisfy them.
Theorem 4.6 (Boolos’ Proof is not Rosserian) Suppose that a consistent and RE exten-
sion T of Q satisfies the following condition for any formula ψ :
(iii) T ⊢ PrT (⊥)→ PrT (ψ).
If T + Con(T ) is inconsistent then for any b ∈ N we have T ⊢ Def <5·ℓTT (b), and so
T ⊢ ¬BoolosT (b).
Proof. If T ⊢ ¬Con(T ) then T ⊢ PrT (⊥) and so T ⊢ PrT (ψ), for any ψ, by the
condition (iii). In particular, if ψ is a formula with length less than 5ℓT (for example
Berry <x
′
(x)) then T ⊢ PrT
(
D(ψ, b)
)
and so for any arbitrary number b we have the
following deduction: T ⊢ ∃x
[
len(x) < 5 · ℓT ∧ PrT
(
D(x, b)
)]
. Thus T ⊢ Def <5·ℓTT (b),
whence T ⊢ ¬Berry <5·ℓTT (b) and T ⊢ ¬BoolosT (b). ❑
So, if T + Con(T ) is not consistent, then ¬Def <5·ℓTT (b) is not independent from the
theory T (neither is BoolosT (b)) for any b. However, if T + Con(T ) is consistent, then
a variant of Boolos’ proof can go through (cf. [10, Theorem 7.2]) as is shown in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.7 (Boolos’ Theorem, restated) If an RE extension T of Q satisfies the fol-
lowing condition for anym,n, k ∈ N,
(iv) T ⊢ PrT
(
D(k,m)
)
∧ PrT
(
D(k, n)
)
∧m 6= n→ ¬Con(T ),
and the theory T + Con(T ) is consistent, then there exists some b ∈ N such that
¬Def <5·ℓTT (b), and also BoolosT (b), is independent from T .
Proof. First we show that there exists some a such that T 0 Def <5·ℓTT (a). If not, then
for any i we have T ⊢ Def <5·ℓTT (i). Let k be a fixed number greater than the maximum
Gödel codes of formulas φ with len(φ) < 5ℓT . So, for any i 6 k we have the deduction
T ⊢ ∃z < k PrT
(
D(z, i)
)
. By Lemma 3.8 there exists some i < j 6 k and some ℓ < k
such that T ⊢ PrT
(
D(ℓ, i)
)
∧ PrT
(
D(ℓ, j)
)
. Now (iv) implies that T ⊢ ¬Con(T ), a
contradiction. Let b be the minimum of those a’s with T 0 Def <5·ℓTT (a). So, we have
the deduction T ⊢ ∀z < bDef <5·ℓTT (z). Now we show that T 0 ¬Def
<5·ℓT
T (b): If
not (T ⊢ ¬Def <5·ℓTT (b)) then T ⊢ Berry
<5·ℓT
T (b) or equivalently, T ⊢ BoolosT (b).
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So, b is definable in T by a formula with length less than 5ℓT (see the proof of The-
orem 4.3) whence Def <5·ℓTT (b) is true thus provable in T ; a contradiction. Therefore,
we showed that T 0 Def <5·ℓTT (b) and T 0 ¬Def
<5·ℓT
T (b) (also T 0 BoolosT (b) and
T 0 ¬BoolosT (b)). ❑
Thus, the consistency of T + Con(T ) is an optimal (indeed, necessary and sufficient)
condition for the independence of a Boolos sentence from T .
5 Concluding Remarks
The following table summarizes some of the new and old results in this paper:
Proof Constructive Rosser Property
GÖDEL (1931) [6] X X [8]
ROSSER (1936) [17] X X
KLEENE1 (1936) [12] X X Theorem 2.3
KLEENE2 (1950) [13] X X
CHAITIN (1971) [4] X [16, 23],Theorem 3.5 X Theorem 3.9
BOOLOS (1989) [2] X Theorem 4.5 X Theorem 4.6
Let us note that for the constructivity of a proof, usually, no new argument is needed as a
computational procedure could often be seen from the proof. But the non-cosntructivity
of a proof (as in the case of Chaitin’s and Boolos’ proofs) should be proved; proving the
non-constructivity (the non-existence of any algorithm) is usually harder than showing the
constructivity (the existence of an algorithm). So is having the Rosser property of a proof.
Other than Rosser’s proof and Kleene’s symmetric theorem (1950) Chaitin’s proof has
the Rosser property. The non-Rosserian proofs of Gödel and Boolos need the consistency
of T + Con(T ) for the independence of their true but unprovable sentences, and this
condition, Con
(
T + Con(T )
)
, is optimal (for the independence of that sentences).
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